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Power, Privilege, and Entitlement in China, Unlearned Lessons, Unacknowledged Baggage--the KMT Part II, Losing Taiwan
Saturday April 23, by Jerome F. Keating Ph.D.

Power, privilege, and entitlement, how hard they are to sacrifice, even for the noble cause of one’s country. Such is the history of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as well.

Post World War II western newspaper headlines often portrayed China as caught in a struggle between pro-democracy KMT Nationalists (the good guys) and the totalitarian CCP Communists (the bad guys). In reality, China had two Leninist-trained parties struggling for power and privilege; each bent on creating their own one party state.

Sun Yat-sen’s expressed beliefs of government of the people, by the people and for the people had never gotten off the ground. These principles satisfied the needs of the leaders in a culture where the memorization of catch phrases were part and parcel of keeping idealistic minions (and even good men) from a focus and critical analysis of reality. In practice the age-old mentality of government of the privileged, by the privileged and for the privileged prevailed. Neither the KMT nor the CCP wanted a democracy for China. Such remains true even now among hard core KMT and CCP but I get ahead of the story.

In Part I we saw that by 1949, the KMT had in its first fifty years lost the hearts and minds of the Chinese people. In its next fifty years the KMT would lose the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese. This is that story.

With victory of Japan in 1945, the United States Military presented Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang forces with Japan’s colonial island of Taiwan for their stewardship. In typical pragmatic fashion, the USA after achieving its immediate goal did not have a long-range plan to go with it. Taiwan’s status was not clearly spelled out nor would it be in the subsequent San Francisco Treaty of 1952. The treaty would only state that Japan must give up Taiwan and the Pescadores, but it did not say to whom. This ambiguity could be used to advantage down the road by the USA but like a two-edged sword it would also have its dangers.

In World War II, Taiwan had been bombed regularly by American airplanes. Kaohsiung, with its major port facilities, airfield and submarine base, was a natural target, as well as any city or area with other military targets, airfields, and port facilities. The destruction that Taiwan suffered during the war however was not that devastating. It would not even come close to what the KMT would bring about after the war.

On the mainland in China, the struggle between the KMT and CCP broke out again. Thus, with this backdrop, Chiang Kai-shek’s army came to Taiwan not to rescue but to pillage. Anything and everything that could serve the KMT’s losing war effort on the mainland was taken. Rice, iron, scrap metal, copper wiring, machinery, factories, etc. whatever had any use or value for the military or that could be sold in the black market in Shanghai disappeared. Taiwanese who at first welcomed the KMT, quickly came to loathe the carpetbaggers they found on their shores. Taiwan was to experience suffering and deprivation like it had never known.

Anger with this pillaging and accompanying rampant corruption built up. Finally it exploded on February 28, 1947 in what is known as the infamous 2/28 Incident or “er-er-ba.” Advisors sent by Chiang Kai-shek to evaluate the uprising accurately reported that widespread corruption under the island’s chief executive and Garrison Commander Chen Yi was the major cause; they recommended reforms. Chiang Kai-shek, however, ignored this advice. Instead in true Leninist fashion he used the occasion to clamp down with an iron fist and eliminate any political opposition.

A prime group singled out for elimination was that of Taiwan’s intelligentsia and leaders. Already schooled in electing representatives and participation in government under the Japanese, these men posed a clear threat to any one party rule. They naively negotiated with Chen Yi in good faith to end the abuses. Chen Yi, however, used the negotiations to gather as many names as he could and bide for time until Chiang Kai-shek could send sufficient troops to subdue the island. Even as these soldiers disembarked in Keelung, they began killing anyone who was in their way. An estimated 30,000 would die in this and the subsequent suppression; the number would be far greater in the following White Terror.

Chen Yi, a man, who had a history of doing Chiang’s dirty work, would be removed to satisfy public relations but he would then be rewarded with the position of Provincial Chairman in Zhejiang Province.

Chen Yi is a perfect example of the type of person Chiang Kai-shek accepted as his administrators. Chiang could tolerate corruption; what he asked most of his followers was that they be loyal and not even think of trying to supplant him.

A career profiteer, Chen Yi had originally defected to Chiang’s forces from the warlord Sung Chuang-fang during the 1927 Northern Expedition when it appeared that Chiang would win. He later took on the task of the ruthless suppression of the 19th Route Army for Chiang. In 1935 as a guest of the Japanese he visited Taiwan and was impressed with its prosperous infrastructure and reported such to Chiang. During World War II, he fought the Japanese but also worked profitable side deals with them. His character would eventually prove his undoing as Provincial Chairman in Zhejiang. In 1948-9 he began to sense the Communists would win and started to free communist prisoners as a prelude to jumping ship. This Chiang could not tolerate and Chen Yi was brought to Taiwan as a prisoner in the 1949 exodus. He would be executed in 1950 as a sacrificial goat to appease the Taiwanese and media and deflect criticism from Chiang about 2/28.

Back in China, as the civil war raged on, the Constitution of the Republic of China had become official on January 1, 1947. Supposedly the period of tutelage was over. Democratic elections were held for the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan in 1947 and in April 1948 Chiang Kai-shek would be elected President. However, as things continued to go from bad to worse, legal steps were taken to ensure KMT rule. On May 9th, 1948, the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion” were enacted. This gave President Chiang Kai-shek unlimited powers of the government and forbade the formation of new political parties.

When the KMT and whole government would later be transferred to Taiwan in December 1949, the temporary provisions would be used to manipulatively ensure that all of those elected in 1947 would be elected for life because no further elections could be held on the mainland. These provisions were even invoked to give the KMT the right to replace deceased members of the assembly with those who had come in second and third in the 1947 elections.

A government of the people, by the people and for the people that was already 50 years in waiting would be on hold for another 40 years until Lee Teng-hui would do away with these privileges in 1991.

A second factor directly involving Taiwan was the imposition of martial law on May 19th, 1949. This was to forestall any problems that might occur if the mainland had to be evacuated. (Martial law would last until 1987—again an outrageously long time for a country dedicated to democracy.)

From the beginning, the KMT on Taiwan, as a one party state had already confiscated all of the public and private buildings, corporations, property, and assets of colonial Japan. Taiwan basically became a colony of the KMT with the only difference that the KMT driven from the mainland at the end of 1949 had to rule from the island. This boon in property and assets would add more to the privileges and wealth of the KMT and loyal followers. Even to this day, the KMT is loath to give any of these privileged possessions up. Ways have been sought to either sell them for profit for the KMT war chests or to transfer them to the private party of upper echelon members.

With the introduction of martial law in 1949, the period of White Terror on Taiwan began in full. The Garrison Command suppressed not only any communist threat but also any attempt to participate in the government. The definition of communist was expanded to mean anyone who would not accept the KMT one party state.

A symbiotic complicity arose between the KMT party leadership, the military, and KMT business interests. With its wealth the party had the ability to influence and limit any opposition either by payoffs or bribery. If that did not work there was the threat of imprisonment. As long as the KMT’s one party rule and privilege was not threatened, people were free to go about their own business. But if the government’s position were ever challenged the guilty would be dealt with harshly.

In the outside world, by January 1950 President Truman of the United States realized that he had thrown enough money down the sinkhole of the corrupt KMT; he was willing to cut his losses and he refused to give anymore. But as fate would have it, when Truman was willing to let the last man standing (KMT or PRC) win, the PRC intervened in the Korean War. Fearing a spread of Communism, the USA brought the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and once again it supported the Chiang regime.

With the 7th Fleet in the Strait, any land attack on Taiwan became impossible. Some will credit Chiang Kai-shek with at least preserving Taiwan from Communist take over. A simple look at the facts showed that Mao’s forces had failed in taking Kinmen in the battle of Kuningtou (October 25—27, 1949) where the distance from the mainland was only two kilometers. In that battle 20,000 attacked the island; in two days some 13,000 were killed and 7,000 captured. If the CCP could not take Kinmen with an amphibious landing how could they expect to cross the 100 kilometers of the treacherous Taiwan Strait especially without air cover.

This reality did not keep Chiang from using the rhetoric of the threat of communist invasion as the reason for him to keep power. He also further stoked the foolish fires of hope among the KMT that he like a savior could retake the Mainland and return them to their rightful place. However, if Mao could not take Taiwan; likewise Chiang could not take China.

Again simple catch phrases were bandied about to spur on the naïve idealists in the party. “This year preparation; next year invasion” With an extreme short-term memory, the KMT forgot how all too recently they had been run out of China. They forgot that their armies could not even hold defensive positions in China. They forgot that the people had rejected their corruption. How then could they even expect to gain a foothold when their feeble supply lines would have to stretch across the Taiwan Strait? How then could they even believe China looked on them as saviors?

No Taiwan and China had settled into their own cold war of propaganda and posturing. For Chiang, the expense of maintaining an army of over 600,000 men served in reality only for the purpose of maintaining his control of the island.

At this point the Taiwan Miracle must be addressed. The miracle did happen and it is a credit to astute KMT governmental management and hard work or the people of Taiwan. As both sides of the Taiwan Strait settled into their stand off, Taiwan would develop into a world class economy. But again perspective is needed.

First, the devastation wrought on Taiwan after WWII was not the result of the war; it was result of the four years of corruption and carpetbaggers after the war. The KMT was only solving what it had wrought. Second, it is easier to create a miracle if you have complete control over the whole economy and can shuffle incompetents to less responsible positions. Third, there were still tremendous after effects and downsides.

If one makes a comparison at the same time after World War II there was also taking place a Japanese Miracle and a German Miracle. Both of these defeated countries started out much more devastated than Taiwan. Further both Japan and Germany created their miracles quicker; and they did it while lifting martial law and creating viable, functioning democracies far in advance of Taiwan. (Reference July 19th Entry “A Dream Deferred, Chiang Kai-shek’s True Legacy”)

This is the baggage that the KMT carried with it into the 1970’s. There can be little wonder why the Taiwanese that had not been bought off or imprisoned were not enamored of it. Democracy would eventually come to Taiwan, but ironically it would not be because of the KMT rather it would be because of the demands, sacrifice and efforts of the tangwai (those outside the party) and the many that had been driven from the island. Despite such tremendous odds listed above, people still wanted and were willing to fight for democratic representation.

“Doctors can bury their mistakes, architects have to live with theirs.” The Kaohsiung Incident in December 1979 would be the watershed in Taiwan’s democracy movement. By the time of this incident, Taiwan was passing from a “doctor status” where mistakes and dead bodies could no longer be buried into that of “architect” where they would have to live with them openly. More and more foreigners were present. Amnesty International was more and more aware of the imprisonment of political dissidents. World press and media had more access to Taiwan.

The KMT still controlled the media and education. However, as the scrutiny of the world increased, it was becoming harder and harder to bury mistakes. At the same time, the Republic of China had lost its seat in the United Nations (1971) and the United States would formally recognize the PRC (1979). Political leverage with other nations had been lost, if the KMT wanted to maintain its legitimacy as a government of the people it somehow had to demonstrate to the world that it offered more than the oppressive regime across the Strait.

By the 1970’s, Taiwanese had been allowed to participate in lower ranking elections but the KMT’s one party state still controlled everything at the national level. Chiang Kai-shek, who had resumed the presidency in 1950, would hold it until his death in 1975 despite the fact that the Constitution only allowed anyone two six-year terms as President.

It is with this that we come to the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident and the subsequent years that led to Taiwan’s democracy. The KMT had existed for over 80 years and still was no nearer to Sun Yat-sen’s concept of government by the people. The Kaohsiung Incident would usher in the major political players that are now on stage in Taiwan. Part III will be the final installment of the KMT’s difficulties in balancing power, privilege and entitlement with democracy.